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Abstract 
It is desirable that pension reforms and legislated rules have the backing of the population or at least are 
accepted by voters. One way that might contribute to such acceptance is to inform participants on the 
pension plan’s logic, its rules, and its financial restrictions. With the objective of achieving “acceptance”, 
the Swedish Pensions Agency  is compelled by legislation to publish an annual actuarial balance (global 
information) of the solvency of the whole public pension system and at the same time distribute to each 
participant information on his or her individual accumulated notional balance and funded accounts, 
movements during the year, and estimates of the projected individual future pension amount. This 
paper describes the Swedish pension experience in communication with pension participants over the 
last decade, together with the main changes in information delivered to improve individuals’ pension 
knowledge and help them make more informed, better decisions on work, savings, and retirement. The 
paper also presents how the confidence and understanding of both contributors and pensioners have 
evolved over time.  
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1 Introduction 
Pensions are sufficiently complex to be very hard to understand. Barr and Diamond (2008) emphasize 
that public pension systems likely need to be adjusted due to changes in demographic and economic 
conditions and may also change with political circumstances, adding even more complexity. New (1999) 
states that the problem may not be lack of information but an information-processing problem. With an 
information-processing problem, the problem is too complex for many agents to make rational choices 
even when they have the necessary information. Specifically, for pension products, the long-time 
horizon between the payment of contributions and receipt of benefits produces inherent difficulties in 
understanding the product (Larsson, Sundén, and Settergren 2009). 
According to Fornero (2015), political parties tend to look at reforms from an ideological perspective 
and conceal their more technical aspects. If system participants do not understand the reform and 
accept its basic principles, it risks underperforming relative to desired behavioral effects and even being 
repealed. Information is thus important not only for individual well-being but also for society. For 
individuals, knowledge of the system’s rules is essential to avoid mistakes about the difference between 
expected and actual pension benefits. Information on the financial sustainability of the pension system 
is also fundamental in the sense that if participants misinterpret the system and the need for reform, 
they will try to reverse it. Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b) and Biggs (2010) state that access to 
financial information and appropriate planning may have a positive impact on decision making 
concerning retirement. Moreover, information about pension benefits influences the age at which 
individuals retire (Sundén 2013). Similarly, Boeri and Tabellini (2012) point out that reforms can obtain 
popular support if they are well-described, explained, and understood. However, empirical evidence 
(Mitchell 1988; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a, 2011) indicates that most individuals have very limited 
information about the core elements of social insurance systems and on the key variables that define 
the amount of their pensions. 
In the last decades, governments in several countries have tried to facilitate contributors’ decision 
making by regularly sending statements about their individual pension position and estimates of the 
expected pension benefits. For example, the Social Security Statement in the United States, the Orange 
Envelope in Sweden and, since 2016, in Italy, and the Yellow Envelope in Germany all do this.2 
Whenever pension reforms are carried out to restore financial sustainability, pension authorities in the 
involved countries will face new trials. Sweden has spent nearly two decades grappling with the 
difficulties of providing mass information on something as complicated as the pension system, and 
several scholarly articles are already published on the subject.  
                                                          
2 See Kritzer and Smith (2016) for more information. In the United States, distribution of information on paper has 
stopped but participants can request their Social Security Statement online. 
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With this in mind, this paper aims to assess the Swedish pension experience with both individual 
information and information on financial sustainability in terms of its effectiveness toward participants’ 
understanding of and confidence in the pension system. Special attention is given to the main changes 
carried out toward communication to improve individuals’ pension knowledge and help them to make 
better decisions. The paper also examines how changes in the solvency of the system that affects (or 
risks affecting) the value of the pension benefit influence individuals’ confidence in the system over 
time. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Swedish public pension 
system. Section 3 describes the main channels of communications: the actuarial balance together with 
its main financial indicators over the 2007–2016 period (global information) and the so-called Orange 
Envelope (individual information). Main changes in the accounting information and the Orange Envelope 
over time are also discussed together with the role of the Swedish Pensions Agency. Section 4 shows 
one measure of the effectiveness of the Swedish information on communication by means of survey 
results. The annual surveys mainly assess the level of confidence in the pension system, the main 
channels used by individuals to get pension information, their understanding of the pension system, and 
pension participants’ knowledge to make retirement decisions. Section 5 provides the main conclusions, 
while an Appendix provides a sample of the Orange Envelope. 
2 Sweden’s public pension system3 
Sweden’s public pension system consists of two different earnings-related benefit schemes: a notional 
defined contribution (NDC) scheme (called the inkomstpension) on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing 
basis, and a fully funded financial defined contribution (FDC) pension (called the premium pension). The 
contribution rates for the two schemes are 18.5 percent of the pension base, with a split of 16 percent 
for the NDC pension and 2.5 percent for the FDC scheme.4 A tax-financed guaranteed pension, annually 
adjusted according to the consumer price index, also provides supplementary support for retirees with 
low NDC pensions. 
2.1 Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme 
NDCs, also known as defined contribution unfunded pension schemes, are ruled by a common principle: 
they attempt to reproduce the logic of a defined contribution pension plan within a PAYG framework. 
However, the PAYG financing principle has not excluded the accumulation of a substantial buffer fund. 
The notional account is a virtual one that records individual contributions, together with the fictitious 
return that they generate throughout each contributor’s working life. The return that contributions earn 
                                                          
3 For a more detailed description of the Swedish pension system, see the Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2018) 
and Barr (2013). The latter paper also evaluates the pension system in Sweden against the goals established at the 
time of the reforms in the late 1990s. 
4 Contributions only give pension credits for incomes up to the “ceiling” in the public pension system, which is 
approximately 130 percent of an average income. This is low in international comparison. 
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is calculated on the basis of a macroeconomic index, not market returns. The index either tries to 
directly reflect the financial health of the system (i.e., contribution base or gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth) or, as in the Swedish scheme, what is thought of as a socially and intergenerationally 
desirable “return,” such as the change in average income, but adjusted if financial health so requires. 
The account balance is called notional because it is only used for revaluing past contributions (i.e., the 
system does not invest funds as the scheme is based on PAYG financing). When an individual retires,5 his 
or her accumulated contributions (or the notional account) are converted into a life annuity according to 
standard actuarial practice. Therefore, the amount of the initial pension depends on the expected 
mortality of the retiring cohort, expected future pension indexations, and the rate used to discount the 
cash flows. 
Under the Swedish NDC scheme, both accounts and benefits are, normally, indexed by the change in the 
average income, as measured by the so-called income index. When the initial pension is calculated – 
that is, when the notional account value is converted into an annuity – the pension is increased or 
frontloaded on the basis of an assumed annual real growth rate of 1.6 percent for the income index. 
This rate of advanced interest is then deducted every year from the increase in the income index. Thus, 
the NDC pension is indexed annually by the change in the income index reduced by 1.6 percent.  
2.2 The automatic balancing mechanism applied to the NDC scheme 
In certain situations, exceptions to the regular income indexation of accounts and benefits may apply. 
These exceptions are governed by the ratio of assets to liabilities (balance ratio6) as provided in the 
legislation on the automatic balancing mechanism (ABM). The balance ratio is an indicator that emerges 
from the actuarial balance sheet of the NDC scheme and is expressed as the ratio of assets (e.g., 
contribution asset and fund assets) and pension liabilities. The balance ratio used in Sweden has a dual 
purpose—to measure whether the system can fulfil its obligations to its contributors and to decide 
whether the ABM should be applied. 
If for some reason the balance ratio is less than 1, the ABM is triggered (Settergren 2001). This process 
basically consists of reducing the growth in pension liability (i.e., the pensions in payment and the 
pension account balances of the economically active population). 
2.3 Funded financial defined contribution (FDC) scheme 
Under the FDC scheme, participants have an individual financial account and their pension contributions 
are invested in funds chosen by the members themselves. A large number of funds exist from which to 
choose. The rate of return on the individual accounts is determined by the return on the funds chosen 
                                                          
5 In Sweden, retirement is flexible and pension benefits can be withdrawn from age 61. When converting benefits 
into annuities, the life expectancy of the cohort is taken into account. 
6 To indicate that the solvency ratio of a PAYG scheme is different from that of a premium reserve plan, which is a 
fully funded plan, the inkomstpension system calls this ratio the balance ratio rather than the solvency ratio. 
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by the individual. The FDC pension can be drawn in either traditional insurance with profit annuity or 
fund insurance – also known as unit-linked insurance. In both forms of insurance, the value of the 
pension account is divided by an annuity divisor in the same way as with the NDC scheme. But for the 
premium pension, unlike the NDC, the annuity divisor is based on forecasts of future life expectancy 
rather than the current period life expectancy. The initial pension of both forms of insurance is credited 
with an interest rate of 1.75 percent and a deduction for costs of 0.1 percent (Swedish Pensions Agency 
2017). 
3 Channels of communication 
To make decisions about at which age to retire and how much to save, participants in the Swedish 
pension system need information about how the level of benefits is affected by their income, their 
number of years of contributions, and the retirement age. One challenge for the communication is to 
convey that the ABM is a regular component of the indexation of earned pension rights. The annual 
report (which includes accounting information) and the Orange Envelope provide information to 
participants regarding their individual pension and the sustainability of the whole pension system. 
3.1 Accounting information: The actuarial balance sheet 
The Swedish administration produces an actuarial balance sheet and an income statement every year 
following the principle of double-entry bookkeeping. Since 2001, its annual report has presented an 
overall picture of the financial health7 of the Swedish pension system. For those who want to delve 
deeper into the details, the annual report also provides a detailed description on how the national 
pension works, gives three scenarios (optimistic, pessimistic, and base) for the future of the pension 
system, and includes some special discussion features on pensions. 
The balance sheet for the Swedish NDC scheme, shown in Table 1, can be defined as a financial 
statement listing the pension system’s obligation to contributors and pensioners (i.e., liabilities to 
contributors and pensioners) on a particular date together with the amounts of the various assets (e.g., 
financial assets and the value of the flow of contributions) that back up these commitments. The 
balance sheet also contributes to the management and disclosure of financial information because it is 
useful not only for the authority administrating the system but also for contributors and pensioners in 
general and for the body that guarantees payment (i.e., the state and the contributors it represents) 
(Boado-Penas et al. 2008; Boado-Penas and Vidal-Meliá 2013). 
                                                          
7 Allowing for particular differences between countries, actuarial balances are compiled, on a regular basis, in 
countries such as the United States (OASDI 2015), Japan (Actuarial Affairs Division 2014), and Canada (Office of the 
Chief Actuary 2015), among others, to reveal the financial position of the pension system. When calculating the 
actuarial balance, these countries follow the aggregate accounting projection model – see Boado-Penas and Vidal-
Meliá (2013). In Sweden, an actuarial balance sheet, in the accounting sense of the term, is used in the Swedish 
notional pension system. 
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The NDC system’s assets include the estimated value of future pension contributions – referred to as the 
contribution asset – and the buffer fund. The contribution asset is calculated as the turnover duration 
(TD) multiplied by the value of the contributions made in a specific period. Its value in 2017 is 173.6 
percent of GDP, as shown in Table 1. The TD is the expected average length of time between the 
payment of a monetary unit of contribution into the system and the disbursement of the corresponding 
credit in the form of a pension.8 The TD in Sweden has been roughly 31–32 years. 
In the balance sheet, the pension liability includes a liability toward contributors and a liability toward 
pensioners. The liability to contributors is estimated as the notional accumulated capital in contributors’ 
accounts. The liability to pensioners is estimated as the present value of the expected total of all 
pensions paid to current pensioners during their lifetimes, taking into account the current life 
expectancy and the interest rate applied (1.6 percent) when the amount of the initial pension was 
calculated. The pension liability varies from 212.2 percent to 197.4 percent of GDP in 2017 (Table 1). 
                                                          
8 After 2014, the disclosure about the TD has been calculated in terms of the difference between the weighted 
average ages of pensioners and contributors. See the Swedish Pensions Agency (2016), Appendix B, Formula B.3.1. 
7 
Table 1: Balance sheet of the Swedish NDC pension system on December 31, 2007–2017 
Item 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Assets (% of GDP)            
Fund assets 27.2 20.9 25.1 25.4 23.9 26.0 28.1 30.1 29.3 30.0 30.7 
Contribution asset 185.5 191.2 193.5 186.8 186.7 187.7 188.9 187.5 177.6 175.6 173.6 
Total assets 212.7 212.1 218.6 212.2 210.6 213.7 217.0 217.6 206.9 205.6 204.3 
Liabilities and results brought forward (% of GDP)      
Opening results brought forward 3.0 0.5 -7.4 -9.2 2.8 4.3 -2.1 3.2 10.1 3.9 
 
7.5 
Net income or loss for the year -2.5 -7.7 -2.4 12.1 1.5 -6.4 5.5 7.5 -6.0 3.9 -0.6 
Closing results brought forward 0.5 -7.2 -9.8 2.9 4.3 -2.2 3.4 10.7 4.1 7.8 6.9 
Pension liability 212.2 219.3 228.4 209.3 206.3 215.8 213.6 206.8 202.8 197.8 197.4 
Total liabilities and results brought forward 212.7 212.1 218.6 212.2 210.6 213.7 217.0 217.6 206.9 205.6 
 
204.3 
Financial Indicators          
Balancing year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Balance ratio, original definitiona 1.0026 0.9672 0.9570 1.0138 1.0208 0.9901 1.0158 1.0521 1.0201 1.0395 1.0347 
Balance ratio, modified legislationb n.a. 0.9826 0.9549 1.0024 1.0198 0.9837 1.0040 1.0375 1.0067c 1.0132 1.0116 
Turnover duration (years) 31.76 31.67 31.66 31.51 31.44 31.48 31.40 30.37 n.a n.a n.a 
Smoothed turnover duration (years) 31.93 31.76 31.76 31.67 31.66 31.51 31.48 31.44 30.38 30.14 29.86 
GDP (SKr billions) 3,297 3,388 3,289 3,520 3,657 3,685 3,770 3,937 4,200 4,404 4,600 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2018).  
Note: Original information is stated in Swedish currency. GDP = gross domestic product; n.a.= not applicable.  
a The balance ratio calculated according to the previous definition (in 2007). It is calculated solely on the basis of 
the buffer fund’s market value as of December 31 of the corresponding year, formerly called the financial position.  
b The balance ratio calculated according to the new definition (2008 onward). It is calculated on the basis of a 
three-year average of the buffer fund’s market value.  
c The damped balance ratio is used instead of the balance ratio from 2015 onward. It is equal to 1 plus one-third of 
the difference between the balance ratio fixed for that year and the number 1. 
Under the FDC scheme, the insurance assets are reported at their so-called “true value,” defined as the 
market value. The insurance assets have increased continuously since 2007. Specifically, the value of 
insurance assets increased from 10 percent of GDP in 2007 to 25 percent in 2017.9 The main component 
of the insurance assets of the fully funded system is fund insurance, which amounted to almost 94 
percent of total assets and is invested 90 percent in stocks and shares and 10 percent in bonds and 
other interest-bearing securities. The change in insurance assets chiefly refers to newly earned pension 
credit, positive changes in value, allocated management fees, and pension disbursements. With 
traditional insurance, the pension liability is the value of the remaining guaranteed disbursement. 
3.2 Changes in the accounting information 
Before 2008, the system’s balance ratio was greater than 1, and the total assets and the pension liability 
had risen, with a rather higher growth in liabilities than in total assets. In 2008, the financial position of 
                                                          
9 For more details, see the Swedish Pensions Agency (2008–2018). 
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the pension system substantially deteriorated. The balance ratio dropped below 1 for the first time, 
amounting to 0.9672, as shown in Table 1, due to a large net loss of SEK 261 billion, equivalent to 7.7 
percent of GDP. According to the original legislation, balancing should have been activated with a 3.28 
percent reduction of the indexation of notional accounts and pensions in 2009/2010. However, in 2009, 
the parliament changed the legislation so that rather than using the buffer fund value at December 31, a 
three-year average of the buffer fund should be used for calculating the balance ratio. As a result, the 
modified balance ratio increased to 0.9826, and the balancing effect was reduced to 1.74 percent. 
In 2009, the system still faced financial deficit, but the loss (2.4 percent of GDP) was not as large as that 
of the previous year. The total assets were less than 4.3 percent of the pension liability, for a balance 
ratio of 0.9549. The pension liability was 228.4 percent of GDP, the highest value during the period. The 
negative indexation of notional accounts and benefits in 2009 and 2010 forced a significant drop in the 
value of the pension liability, and then, assets exceeded liabilities at the end of 2010. This surplus was 
equal to 0.0024 percent, for a balance ratio of 1.0024. 
The pension system solvency was restored for a couple of years, but at the end of 2012, the pension 
liability exceeded total assets again, producing a balance ratio of 0.9837. Balancing was activated, and 
the indexation of pension balances and pension disbursements was decreased in 2013/2014. 
Consequently, the pension system has been strengthened financially since 2013. The pension liability 
reached a value of 213.6 percent of GDP in 2013 and dropped to 206.8 percent of GDP in 2014, while 
the balance ratio increased to 1.004 in 2013 and 1.0375 in 2014. The surplus in assets over liability has 
been used, as is stipulated by the ABM legislation, to restore the value of benefits and accounts; as of 
2018 the value of benefits and accounts are back where they would have been if no reduction of the 
indexing had occurred. In 2015, new rules were introduced with the aim of reducing the volatility in the 
balance ratio, caused mainly by the smoothing used in the income index. With this objective, smoothing 
of the indexation, identified to be inefficient at best and counterproductive at worse, was abolished and 
replaced by a smoothing of the balance ratio (referred to as the damped balance ratio). As a result, the 
balance ratio in 2015 amounted to 1.0067. The damped balance ratio restricts balancing to one-third, 
resulting in less volatility in pension benefits when balancing is activated at the cost of regaining 
financial solvency more slowly. 
3.3 Individual information to participants: The Orange Envelope 
In 1999, as part of the reform of the Swedish pension system, a so-called Orange Envelope was 
introduced to provide individuals with a full picture of their up-to-date national pension accounts. 
Annually, the pension administration sends out the Orange Envelope to participants who have 
contributed to the pension system as well as retirees receiving pension benefits. At the same time, the 
government launched a public information campaign to inform workers about the new system.   
This personal statement includes separate account information on the NDC and premium pension 
accounts containing the current value of each account, changes in value since the last statement, 
pension contributions made during the year, administrative costs, and estimates of the future pension 
amount. In addition to providing information on the expected benefits, the Orange Envelope 
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summarizes how the new pension system works and highlights to insured persons that benefits are 
determined, through contributions, by lifetime earnings. For the funded account, a breakdown of 
information by fund is also provided, including the allocation of each fund that the participant chooses, 
and the actual distribution. Specifically, as shown in the Appendix: 
The first page displays the monthly national public pension forecast that the member  is expected to 
receive before tax under the retirement ages of 61, 65, and 70.10  The reason for having several different 
retirement ages is to explain how retirement age impacts the size of monthly pension payments; i.e., the 
longer the contributor works, the higher the pension amount. This page also illustrates the hierarchy of 
the pension sources that the participant would earn. The first order indicates the national public 
pension, both NDC and FDC, while the occupational pension is in the middle of the hierarchy, followed 
by the private pension, if any.  
On the second page, the dynamics of the pension values of each account—income pension and 
premium pension account—during the year are presented (based on information from two years 
before). The statement consists of the account value of the previous year, the contributions assigned, 
the amount received for the survivors’ dividend—the pension balance of contributors who die before 
reaching retirement age, which is distributed among surviving members of their birth cohorts—and the 
administrative and fund fees charged. Furthermore, this page illustrates the values of the premium 
pension account with the breakdown of the portfolio, the allocation of each fund that the accountholder 
chooses, and their actual values. Contributors will know the development of the premium pension funds 
in more detail, in particular where the money is invested and how much they pay in fees. The changes in 
value are also shown in percentage terms that can be compared with the data for the average 
participant. 
The third page provides forecasts of the individual monthly pension amount under different retirement 
ages. An explanation of the alternative retirement age is also provided. 
The last page gives the total pension credits, which basically means the money paid in during the year, 
and decomposes the contributions made for each account. The amount of pensionable income is also 
illustrated. 
3.4 Changes in the Orange Envelope 
                                                          
10 The age of 61 is the earliest possible age at which old-age pension may be received. The age of 65 is chosen 
because it was/is the normal retirement age, being the retirement age under the old system. The age of 65 is also 
when certain social insurance benefits, such as sickness and disability benefits and unemployment insurance, come 
to an end, and others start, such as a guarantee pension and housing supplements for pensioners. The age of 70 
was chosen to provide a retirement age after 65. 
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The contents and the number of pages of the Orange Envelope have been continuously redesigned11 
since its introduction in 1999. The aim of the changes is that the information mailed out needs to be as 
simple and concise as possible. But for interested and knowledgeable individuals, other ways of finding 
out more are available (e.g., online services), as explained next. 
In 2002, the statement started to include information on the premium pension account so that 
individuals would have a better idea of the overall pension they expect to receive. 
In 2006, an effort was made to enhance individuals’ understanding of pension issues, including an 
explanation of how the pension system works. 
It was acknowledged that contributors (i.e., pension savers, new entrants to the labor market, and old-
age pensioners) had different interests regarding information provided. Therefore, since 2007, there 
have been three different versions of the Orange Envelope targeting these three specific population 
groups. The new pension savers receive almost the same version as the one for existing pension savers 
except that new savers receive a separate insert with general information on choosing funds, while 
existing savers receive specific information about their premium pension choices. Pensioners’ 
statements contain the pension payments for the year, the value of the premium pension account, the 
pension payments made in the previous year, and tax deductions. 
In 2011, the assumption of the 2 percent wage growth used to project pension benefits was removed 
because the surveys indicated that it was too confusing. There would be only one scenario, 0 percent 
average wage growth, included in the Orange Envelope. Zero growth over a long period is highly 
improbable, but this scenario is easier for individuals to understand as the forecasted pension amount is 
expressed in current price and wage levels at the time of the projection.12 
In 2012, a graph was added to explain the relationship between increasing life expectancy and an 
“alternative” retirement age. The alternative retirement age is specific for each birth cohort and is 
defined as the age until which an individual should be working to receive the same pension amount s/he 
would have received at age 65 if life expectancy had remained unchanged. This graph is intended to 
make people aware of how improvements in life expectancy impact the amount of benefits. 
In 2013, the Swedish Pensions Agency and the Premium Pension Authority, together with the insurance 
companies for the occupational plans, launched a website (https://secure.pensionsmyndigheten.se/B3). 
This website presents individual projections of both the public pension and occupational pension 
benefits and the total projected pensions. As a result, an insert was included on the first page of the 
                                                          
11 For more details, see Kritzer and Smith (2016). 
12 The assumed rate of return on the funded individual account is 3.5 percent. Also, only known values of the 
balance ratio and balance index are used in the projection for the national pension, as it is unclear how long and 
how fast the financial balance is recovering and when income indexation should apply again. 
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Orange Envelope to announce that forecasts of the entire pension (i.e., national, occupational, and 
private) were available online  
The 2014 version of the Orange Envelope was redesigned and shortened to four pages by eliminating 
two graphics: a pyramid to describe the three pension pillars and “piggy banks”. This version also 
provided a personal code to access online information and stressed the importance of all three pillars of 
the retirement income system.  
3.5 The role of the Swedish Pensions Agency 
In 2010, the Swedish Pensions Agency was established, taking over the administration of the national 
retirement pension, which was previously Försäkringskassan’s responsibility, and the premium pension, 
which had previously been handled by the Premium Pensions Agency. The informational challenge was 
one of the main reasons to establish the new Swedish Pensions Agency. Therefore, one of its important 
task is to work toward providing accessible and simple information on the total pension, including the 
public pension, occupational pensions, and private pensions.  
To meet these information needs, the customer service operations of the Agency provide face-to-face 
meetings, telephone customer services, e-services, and printed reports such as the Orange Envelope, 
the annual report, and statistics, among others. 
In 2010, the Swedish Pensions Agency made the webpage www.minpension.se, containing individual 
information on both public and occupational schemes, available as an embedded service from its own 
website www.pensionmyndigheten.se. 
4 Survey results: Does the information work? 
Since 1999, and about one week after individuals should have received the Orange Envelope in the mail, 
the Swedish Pensions Agency has conducted an annual survey about the Orange Envelope to evaluate to 
what extent participants open the envelope, read it, and think that they understand the content. The 
sample consists of 2,000 individuals interviewed by telephone and includes the three different target 
groups: existing pension savers (46 percent of the sample), new pension savers (27 percent), and old-
age pensioners (27 percent). Currently, three-fourths of participants confirm that they open the Orange 
Envelope and one-half of them read some of the content. 
Two other surveys are carried out annually in Sweden. The first one, called the Image Study, consists of 
a sample of 1,600 individuals (1,000 contributors and 600 pensioners) and assesses the confidence of 
pension participants in the Swedish Pensions Agency and the pension system. The Self Confidence and 
Predictability Study, with a sample of 1,000 individuals, is a more recent survey that focuses on 
individuals’ knowledge and self-confidence regarding their own upcoming pension and the pension 
system as a whole. Both knowledge and self-confidence are considered two relevant dimensions to 
estimate how efficient information is. 
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Reported confidence in the Swedish Pensions Agency has slowly but steadily increased over time for 
both retirees and workers (Figure 1). In 2018, 61 percent of retirees and 45 percent of workers had 
some or great confidence in the pension system administration (including information and services), 
while the share of those with little or no confidence decreased slightly. 
Figure 1: Level of confidence in the Swedish Pensions Agency, 2010–2018 
Source: Annual Image Study survey. 
Note: The grades to answer this question are 1–5. Grades 1 and 2 are grouped as negative while 4 and 5 are 
grouped as positive. Grade 3 is rated as neutral, and as is disregarded in the graphics. 
However, the share of participants with confidence in the pension system only reached 36 percent for 
pensioners and 25 percent for contributors in 2018 (Figure 2). At the same time, the share of 
participants with no confidence decreased slightly over the period 2010–2018. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate that the confidence level in both the pension system and the pension 
system administration worsened in 2011, presumably because of the negative income indexation that 
year (and the year before) as a result of the ABM being triggered. 
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Figure 2: Level of confidence in the Swedish pension system, 2010–2018 
 
Source: Annual Image Study survey. 
Note: The grades to answer this question are 1–5. Grades 1 and 2 are grouped as negative while 4 and 5 are 
grouped as positive. Grade 3 is rated as neutral, and as is disregarded from the graphics. 
The level of self-reported understanding toward the functioning of the Swedish pension system has 
improved (Figure 3). One-half of workers and retirees (specifically, 53 percent of retirees and 49 percent 
of workers) find the Swedish pension system’s operations easy to understand. The proportion of 
participants who respond that they find the system difficult to follow has decreased over time, from 41 
percent of workers (33 percent of retirees) in 2010 to 21 percent of workers (20 percent of retirees) in 
2018. Self-reported understanding of issues relating to pension savings has also increased over time; by 
2018 almost everybody (97 percent) had some knowledge of pension issues (Figure 4). The share of 
respondents with enough or good knowledge to make active choices is 48 percent while 49 percent of 
workers report having some grasp on economic and financial concepts. These questions predict the 
ability and probability of gathering and understanding information regarding pensions. 
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Figure 3: Self-reported understanding of the functioning of the Swedish pension system, 2010–2018 
 
Source: Annual Image Study survey. 
 
Figure 4: Self-reported understanding of financial and pension issues, 2010–2018 
 
Source: Annual Image Study survey. 
The share of participants who value the information and support provided has continuously increased 
(Figure 5). In particular, according to the annual Self Confidence and Predictability Survey, 62 percent of 
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respondents in 2018 reported that the Swedish Pensions Agency provided information and support 
needed to make decisions on retirement. 
Figure 5: Do you think you have information and support needed to make decisions on retirement? 
 
Source: Annual Self Confidence and Predictability Survey. 
As shown in Figure 6a, 65 percent of pension participants know where to get an estimate of the total 
amount of their future pension. The number of individuals getting the information from the webpage 
www.minpension.se has increased continuously (Figure 6b). In fact, in 2018, 50 percent of individuals 
used this site as their main channel to get information and support regarding their pension. This 
increase in the number of individuals using www.minpension.se as their main information channel 
happened to the detriment of other channels, such as the Orange Envelope and the general webpage 
www.pensionsmyndigheten.se (although that webpage also links to www.minpension.se). Individuals 
older than 55, however, still prefer the material of the Orange Envelope to a larger extent than younger 
individuals. Specifically, 70 percent of individuals aged 18–28 and 58 percent of those aged 29–54 prefer 
the digital information as opposed to 44 percent of individuals aged 55 and older. Other channels such 
as bank advisors or the call center of the Swedish Pensions Agency are now only used by 12 percent and 
6 percent of the population, respectively.  
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Figure 6: Forecast of the total pension amount 
a. Do you know how to get a forecast of the total amount of your pension? 
 
b. Knowledge about different channels to get information on your upcoming pension sum 
 
Source: Annual Self Confidence and Predictability Survey. 
5 Conclusions  
This paper describes the main channels of communication used by the Swedish administration; i.e., the 
annual report on the solvency of the public system and the Orange Envelope, with information on the 
individual accumulated capital and forecasts of expected benefits. Both the annual report and the 
Orange Envelope have changed over time. The annual report’s changes were mainly carried out in the 
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way of calculating the balance ratio –which is used to trigger the ABM– with the aim of reducing its 
volatility. Changes in the Orange Envelope were targeted to improve the understanding of pension 
participants.  
Surveys carried out show that self-reported use and understanding of the information received has 
slowly increased. Also, the surveys show that confidence in the pension system decreased when the 
ABM was first triggered. It is not surprising that to most people the abstract issue of the financial 
situation of the public pension plan is not understood or accepted as a viable argument for reducing 
what for most people amounts to an important benefit. However, it seems that the communication and 
information to pension participants made the mechanism better understood and, as a result, the level of 
confidence for both workers and retirees did not decrease in successive applications of the mechanism. 
Currently, participants have a lot of channels where they can get information on the pension system in 
general and individual forecasts of their own pension. The Orange Envelope provides a simple and 
concise explanation of the pension system and gives individual information regarding estimates of 
pension under different retirement ages to help people make better retirement decisions. But the 
Swedish Pensions Agency provides more information for those who wish delve deeper into the details. 
In recent years, according to the surveys, the main channel used by participants to get pension 
information is www.minpension.se. It is remarkable that one-half of the population reports finding the 
pension system easy to understand and 65 percent of contributors say they know where and how to get 
an estimate of their future pension. 
The Swedish approach to pension communication has seemingly improved self-reported understanding  
of pension issues and confidence in the system, but room remains for improvement, as almost one-third 
of individuals, according to the surveys, still state that they do not have enough support when making 
retirement decisions. From the Swedish experience, the projected future total pension from 
www.minpension.se has proven to be the most appreciated and valuable information for pension 
participants. Further, information on future pensions likely increases confidence in the public and 
occupational plans as well, although no proof exists yet for this assertion. 
It is worthy to note that, in Sweden, the purpose of the pension information is to make each insured feel 
well-informed about his/her projected future pension and thus increase the level of “self-control” over 
the future pension, and subsequently the insured’s confidence in the pension plan. The surveys’ 
questions only reveal the level of self-reported confidence in the pension plan and the Swedish Pensions 
Agency, however.  
Since there is no control group, for obvious reasons, the effectiveness of the information in these two 
vital aspects cannot be measured with any degree of confidence. The possible actions of those insured 
with regard to the information are: no action, a change in work hours, a change in planned retirement 
age, increased private savings, or amortization or other economic action. To the extent such changes 
can be observed, it is still not possible to claim that any changes are caused by the information.  
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Appendix A: The Orange Envelope 
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